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LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - SEVERABILITY OF ISSUES - Do SEP-
ARATE TRIALS OF ISSUES OF LIABILITY AND DAMAGES VIOLATE THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT? -Plaintiff brought an action for personal injuries sustained when
he was struck by defendant's train. The trial court, sua sponte, ordered, over the
objections of counsel for both parties, separate trial of the issues of liability and
damages. Judgment was entered upon a verdict for defendant on the issue of
liability. Plaintiff appealed on the ground, inter alia, that separation of the issues
deprived him of a jury trial guaranteed by the seventh amendment to the United
States Constitution. Held: affirmed. The seventh amendment does not prevent
the adoption of new procedural forms as long as the essential character of trial by
jury is preserved. Hosie v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 282 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1960).
The action of the trial judge was taken under authority of the recently adopted
Rule 21 of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division:
Pursuant to and in furtherance of Rule 42(b), Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, to curtail undue delay in the administration of justice in personal
injury and other civil litigation wherein the issue of liability may be
adjudicated as a prerequisite to the determination of any and all other
issues, in jury and non-jury cases, a separate trial may be had upon such
issue of liability, upon motion of any of the parties or at the Court's direc-
tion, in any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party claim. .... I
The rule was adopted in an effort to reduce the backlog of cases caused by
the great increase, in recent years, of personal injury litigation.2 Rule 83 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure empowers district courts to make rules for their
practice, to the extent that such rules are not inconsistent with the Federal Rules.
The local rule here is said to be consistent with rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules
which provides:
The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order
a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim,
or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counter-
claims, third-party claims, or issues.
The liberality of the federal rules with respect to joinder of actions and asser-
tion of defendant's claim is complemented by this provision allowing judges -to
order separate trial of issues where convenient or necessary to avoid prejudice.'
Rule 42(b) has often been applied in actions for damages for personal injuries
wherein a release is pleaded as a defense either for the sake of convenience, 4 or
to avoid prejudice.5 Motions are often made for the separate trial of the issues
of jurisdiction,6 laches, 7 and the running of the statute of limitations.8 The sep-
aration will not be granted unless the issue sought to be separately tried can be
proved apart from the other issue or issues.9 The exercise of rule 42(b) "rests in
1 N.D. ILL. R. 21. The rule also provides that the judge may order, where liability is
sustained, trial on any or all of the remaining issues before the same or a different jury.
2 See Miner, Court Congestion: A New Approach, 45 A.B.A.J. 1265 (1959).
3 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1211 (2d ed. 1951).
4 Holt v. Granite City Steel Co., 22 F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Iln. 1957); Kiloski v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 103 F. Supp. 390 (D. Del. 1952); Ross v. Service Lines, 31 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Ill.
1940).
5 Bowie v. Sorrell, 113 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Va. 1953); Larsen v. Powell, 16 F.R.D. 322
(D. Colo. 1954). But see Grissom v. Union Pac. R.R., 14 F.R.D. 263 (D. Colo. 1953).
6 Technical Tape Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 117 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); Carr v. Beverly Hills Corp., 237 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1956).
7 Greenspon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 8 F.R.D. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
8 Drake v. Ming Chi Shek, 155 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1957).
9 "There is . . . no issue of liability separate and apart from the claimed damages."
McClain v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 10 F.R.D. 261, 262 (S.D. Mo. 1950) (action for triple
damages for conspiracy in restraint of trade).
[T]he ground of action is fraud .... An indispensable element of a cause of
action for fraud is damages .... In other words, fraud in the abstract does
not give rise to a claim. It is only fraud causally connected to a claim
which is the basis of an action. United States ex. rel. Rodriguez v. Weekly
Publications Inc., 9 F.R.D. 179, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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the sound discretion of the trial judge."10 But, it has been said, in the exercise
of such discretion a trial judge should be mindful that
[W]ithin the thought of the Rules as a whole, and as a procedural charter,
there is an impalpable suggestion that, in. default of controlling considera-
tions to the contrary, a single submission of all the issues in a civil action
shall be favored rather than their resolution in piecemeal trials.11
In Hosie, plaintiff, in support of his claim that the separation of the issues was
a violation of the seventh amendment, relied upon general statements found in
opinions of the United States Supreme Court, there being, it would appear, no
cases on point. Plaintiff noted that the Court has said that there is a presumption
against waiver of jury trial,12 that "trial by jury" meant a trial as understood and
applied at common law,13 and that only in exceptional cases may distinct causes
of action asserted in a case be separately tried.' The court was not persuaded
that the statements relied upon demonstrated that the procedure followed had
been forbidden by the Supreme Court. Relief might be had, however, if it could
be shown that the procedure was violative of either legislative stricture or constitu-
tional command.
Plaintiff argued that the separation, over his objection, of the issues had de-
prived him of the right to jury trial guaranteed by the seventh amendment which
provides that:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by
a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law.
The meaning attached by the Founding Fathers to a particular provision is
often not the most relevant consideration in constitutional interpretation. But
here it is indeed relevant to ask what right it was the founders sought to preserve.
The consideration given the issue in the Constitutional Convention seems to have
been most casual. Near the end of the sessions, Hugh Williamson of North Caro-
lina noted that, while jury trial had been guaranteed in criminal cases,' 5 there was
no provision for the same in civil cases. There was little discussion, and no objection
to jury trial. But, it was argued,' there should be no right to a jury trial in some
equity and admiralty proceedings; nor was there unanimity on the matter in state
practice. The problem was left to Congress, and, but for later developments, the
question would have been forgotten. 6
The matter was hardly forgotten. ."The objection was at once seized hold of
by the enemies of the Constitution; and it was pressed with an urgence and zeal
which were well-nigh preventing its ratification."'17 It was argued that giving the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, "both as to Law and Fact,"' 8 would destroy
the institution of trial by jury in civil cases.' 9 Hamilton conceded that the objec-
tion was perhaps the most successful challenge to the adoption of the Constitu-
tion.20 In attempting to meet the arguments, Hamilton first argued that the
phrase did not "necessarily imply a reexamination in the Supreme Court of facts
decided by juries in the inferior courts."2' 1 When a case is appealed from an
inferior court to a state court, the higher court can be said to have jurisdiction
of the fact as well as the law, even though the facts have been ascertained by a
10 Grissom v. Union Pac. R.R., 14 F.R.D. 263, 264 (D. Colo. 1953).
11 Eichinger v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 20 F.R.D. 204, 207 (D. Neb. 1957).
12 Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408 (1882).
13 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1929).
14 Miller v. American Bonding 'Co., 257 U.S. 304 (1921).
15 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2(3).
16 FARRANI, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 185 (1953).
17 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 523 (4th ed. 1873).
18 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2(2).
19 Story, op. cit. supra note 20, at 523.
20 THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 538 (Mod. Lib. ed.) (Hamilton).
21 THE FFmRAUiST No. 81, at 532 (Mod. Lib. ed.) (Hamilton).
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jury. Nothing more is implied in the Constitution. Nor can it be said that the
inclusion of the jury trial provision for criminal trials and its omission with respect
to civil trials indicated an intention to abolish the institution. The power to do one
thing is not removed by the command to do another, not inconsistent, thing.2  Nor
does this omission present a threat to liberty, for:
It certainly sounds not a little harsh and extraordinary to affrm that
there is no security for liberty in a Constitution which expressly establishes
the trial by jury in criminal cases, because it does not do it in civil also;
while it is a notorious fact that Connecticut, which has been always regarded
as the most popular State in the Union, can boast of no constitutional pro-
vision for either.2 3
The fear that the right to jury trial was threatened by the adoption of the
Constitution was apparently so great that the explanations of Hamilton were not
persuasive. At the first session of Congress, the objection was directly met by the
adoption of the seventh amendment.24  In its historical context, therefore, the
amendment meant essentially no more than that a party to a common law civil
case was entitled to have a jury make all findings of fact. 25
In Hosie, the court held that:
[I]n the trial of the instant case, the essential character of a trial by jury
was preserved. In our view, the Seventh Amendment does not require the
retention of all the old forms of procedure; nor does it prohibit the intro-
duction of new methods for ascertaining what facts are in issue.26
But the court is careful to point out that the new method approved is separate
trial of the issues of liability and damages before the same jury. A "more difficult
question" is posed by the order, over objection, of separate trial before different
juries. The court did not reach that question.27
Why this is thought a more difficult question is not explained. The court
cites 28 an opinion of Justice Brandeis in which he points out that the "limitation
imposed by the Amendment is merely that enjoyment of the right of trial by jury
be not obstructed, and that the ultimate determination of issues of fact by the jury
be not interfered with.12 9 In addition, in a case relied upons0 but not quoted, the
Supreme Court said,
[T]he Constitution is concerned, not with form, but with substance. All of
vital significance in trial by jury is that the issues of fact be submitted for
determination with such instructions and guidance by the court as will
afford opportunity for that consideration by the jury which was secured
by the rules governing trials at common law.3 '
22 THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 540 (Mod. Lib. ed.) (Hamilton).
23 Id. at 554.
24 Story, op. cit. supra note 20, at 526.
25 [T~he Amendment was designed to preserve the basic institution of jury
trial in only its most fundamental elements, not the great mass of procedural
forms and details, varying even then so widely among common-law juris-
dictions. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943).
The aim of the Amendment . . . is to preserve the substance of the
common-law right of trial by jury, as distinguished from mere matters of
form or procedure, and particularly to retain the common-law distinction
between the province of the court and that of the jury, whereby, in the
absence of express or implied consent to the contrary, issues of law are to
be resolved by the court and issues of fact are to be determined by the
jury.... Baltimore & C. Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1925).
The primary purpose of the amendment was to preserve the historic line
separating the province of the jury from that of the judge, without at the
same time preventing procedural improvement which did not transgress
this line. CoRWIN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, REvISED
AND ANNOTATED 895 (1952).
26 Hosie v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 282 F.2d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 1960).
27 Id. at 642.
28 Id. at 643.
29 Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920).
30 Hosie v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 282 F.2d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 1960).
31 Gasoline Prod. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1930).
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The Seventh Circuit seems to feel that the submission of the separated issues
to two juries may interfere with the ultimate determination by -the jury of questions
of fact, or that the consideration of the issues is not such as was secured at common
law. The court, however, chose not to decide -that issue at this time.
In deciding whether separate trials before the same jury were to be allowed, the
court seems to have confined its decision to the constitutional question raised by
the seventh amendment. The opinion is not unambiguous on this point. The
court notes that Congress, in giving the Supreme Court the power to establish rules
of practice for the federal courts, provided that such rules "shall preserve the right
of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment to
the Constitution."' 2 The Federal Rules provide that the "right of trial by jury
as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute
of the United States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate."33
If the statute can be read as giving a right in addition to that guaranteed by
the amendment, namely "the right of trial by jury as at common law," it would
seem that another, nonconstitutional issue is presented here. The court said that
it "must assume that the Court had in mind the statutory admonition .... M& This
hardly meets the issue. The rule (42[b]) promulgated by the Supreme Court is
not challenged; the local rule is. If the local rule violates the legislative command,
then the court would probably, in order to preserve the federal rule, hold that the
local rule is not consistent with rule 42(b). The court does not make this deter-
mination.
If the petition for certiorari 5 is granted, the Supreme Court may consider
the statutory question first so as to avoid, if possible, the constitutional question.
The rule would seem to favor defendants. While some would argue that separating
the issues of damage and liability would prevent the fact of the injury or the extent
of the harm from being considered in determining liability, it might be thought
that consideration of both issues is, in fact, contemplated by the guarantee of jury
trial.
If the issues are to be separately tried by the same jury, the jury might not be
willing to find liability if it knows that such a finding will necessitate additional
time spent hearing the evidence as to damages. The rule may similarly prejudice
plaintiffs if the jury has reason to believe that the judge has ordered the separate
trial because he does not think that liability can be established.
3 6
Of course, it is not at all certain that the statute guaranteeing the right to
trial by jury "as declared by the Seventh Amendment" and "as at common law"
will be held to have added anything to the Constitution. It has been said that the
"right of trial by jury... preserved ... [by the Seventh Amendment] . . . is the
right which existed under the English common law when the Amendment was
adopted."37 If this is held to be so, the statute has added nothing.
In that event, the Supreme Court may avoid the constitutional issue either by
holding that the district court has exceeded the power granted by rule 83,38 in
that the local rule is inconsistent with rule 42(b), or by deciding that the proce-
dure adopted simply ought not be allowed. The former action might be taken if
it is thought that the supposed prevention of "undue delay in the administration
of justice ' 39 is not such "convenience" as contemplated by rule 42 (b).
32 62 Stat. 961 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958).
33 FED. R. Civ. P. 38.
34 Hosie v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 282 F.2d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 1960).
35 Appeal docketed, No. 600, Dec. 24, 1960, 29 U.S.L. WEEK 3198 (U.S. Jan. 3, 1961).
36 See Brault, Should the Issues of Liability and of Damages in Tort Cases Be Separatedfor the Purposes of Trial? 1960 INs. L.J. 798.
37 Baltimore & C. Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935).
38 FED. R. Crv. P. 83: "Each district court ... may .. . make and amend rules govern-
ing its practice not inconsistent with these rules ....
39 N.D. ILL. R. 21.
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As to the latter possibility, the Court exercises its discretion in deciding what
procedures are to be followed in federal courts in the interests of securing justice.40
In this role it might decide, for reasons, among others, noted above, that the pro-
cedure would not be fair. In this case the separation would be forbidden, not
because of constitutional guarantee or legislative command, but simply because
the Supreme Court will not have it.
This is not to suggest that rule 42(b) itself will be struck down. There would
seem to be no objection to the separate trial of what are regarded as threshold
issues.41 Nor, it would seem, can objection be made where it is clear that the dam-
ages are unusually complicated. 42 While it might be argued that a jury would
be reluctant to find liability and incur the obligation of staying to hear and decide
the issue of damages, it might be thought that this is precisely the case where con-
siderations of convenience necessitate taking such a risk.
If the decision is unfavorable to the local rule, it is likely that the practice
proscribed will be that of allowing the trial judge as a matter of course to con-
sider ordering the separation of the issues in personal injury litigation. It is not
likely that the practice will be completely forbidden.
On the other hand, there are congested calendars in many federal courts. To
the extent that the local rule helps to effectuate the ideal of swift justice, it is to
be regarded as good. In that context, it has been suggested that there is "no reason
why this procedure ... should not be more extensively employed." 43 An end to
court congestion can be had, however, in other ways. The Supreme Court may
well find that the disadvantages of such a broad rule outweigh its merits.
James J. Harrington
LEGISLATION - SURRENDER OF PARTY LINE TELEPHONES IN EMERGENCY-
BASIS OF CIVIL ACTION AND SOME PROBLEMS OF PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL
ACTIONS.- More than half of the states' have enacted penal statutes requiring
a person using a party line telephone to relinquish it, when requested to do so, in
order that an emergency call might be made. The first appellate interpretation
of such a statute was recently made in State v. Zelinski.2 The defendant was con-
40 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
41 See cases cited notes 4 through 8, supra.
42 Hassett v. Modem Maid Packers, Inc., 23 F.R.D. 661 (D. Md. 1959) (four persons
injured in truck-auto collision); Nettles v. General Acc. Fire & Assur. Corp., 234 F.2d 243
(5th Cir. 1956) (three consolidated suits in auto accident against insurers of both vehicles);
Rickenbacher Transp., Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 3 F.R.D. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (damages
to 35 consignors of plaintiff).
43 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1917 (2d ed. 1951).
1 ALASKA Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 49-5-41 to 49-5-44 (Supp. 1958); ARiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-889 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4603 to 41-4605 (Supp. 1959); CONN. GEN.
STAT. REV. § 53-210 (1958); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-7327 to 26-7328 (Supp. 1960); HAWAI
Sxss. LAWS 1957, act 190, § 1; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-6806 to 18-6809 (Supp. 1959);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 134, §§ 16.6 - 16.9 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960); IND. ANN. STAT. §§
10-4934 to 10-4937 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 714.33-714.36 (Supp. 1960); KY. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 75.270 (Supp. 1960); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 557 (1957); MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 28.808(1) -28.808(2) (1954); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 614.71 -614.74 (Supp. 1960) ;
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 170-25.5 (Supp. 1960); N.Y. PEN. LAWS § 1424a (Supp. 1960);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-401.8 (Supp. 1959); N.D. CENTURY CODE ANN. §§ 49-21-17 to
49-21-20 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4931.30 (Page Supp. 1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, §§ 1844-1847 (1958); ORE. REV. STAT. § 166.710 (1959); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,§ 4688.1 (Supp. 1960); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 11-35-14 to 11-35-15 (Supp. 1960); S.D.
'CODE §§ 13.1628 - 13.1630 (Supp. 1960); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 65-2120 to 65-2122 (Supp.
1960); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 3801-3805 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-368 to
18.1-371 (1960); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.85.010-70.85.040 (Supp. 1958); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 941.35 (Supp. 1961).
2 166 A.2d 383 (N.J. 1960).
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victed of refusing to relinquish a phone to a doctor during an alleged emergency.
After considering questions raised by the New Jersey statute,8 the court upheld the
conviction.
The New Jersey statute, like comparable statutes in other states, applies only
to the users of a party line, and only in times of emergency.4 Despite this apparent
simplicity of operation the existence of enforcement problems has been recognized; 5
it may account for the dearth of reported cases.
The state must prove that an emergency existed at the time of the request.
An emergency situation within the purview of the statute construed in Zelinski
occurs when property or human life is in jeopardy and the prompt summoning of
aid is essential. Both conditions are prerequisites to conviction and their existence
is a question of fact to be determined post hoc by a court or jury. The state of
mind of the person making the call is not controlling. A person who refuses to
relinquish a party line when asked to do so must be acquitted if the situation
prompting the call is not proven emergent, regardless of the apprehension of the
caller or the maliciousness of the person refusing to yield the line. Although Mr.
Justice Schettino said in the Zelinski opinion, "The purpose of the statute is to
save human lives, not to gamble with them,"" he spoke after the court had deter-
mined that the trial court had grounds for finding that an emergency, within the
meaning of the statute, did exist. There was expert testimony from a physician that
human life was in danger and an ambulance was needed immediately; this testi-
mony, the court said, was sufficient to sustain the state's burden of proof.
Both the Minnesota and South Dakota statutes provide that there must be
an "actually existing" emergency at the time the party line is requested. What
purpose this provision serves is not clear. The mere definition of "emergency" in
Minnesota and South Dakota, as in most states, seems to require the actual existence
of a perilous situation. Idaho is the only state in which the existence of an emer-
gency within the purview of the statute does not require that, in fact, life or prop-
erty be in danger and aid essential. Instead, emergency telephone calls are defined
as "calls for police, medical and fire aid.' A drawback to this definition is that
a call may be permitted which, in fact, and to the mind of the caller, is quite
lacking in urgency.7
Courts, when confronted with cases involving emergency vehicles, have not
looked to whether the facts show an actual emergency but, rather, whether the
driver of the vehicle had reason to believe from the situation, as presented to his
3 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 170-25.5 (Supp. 1960):
Any person who fails to relinquish a telephone party line, consisting of a
subscriber line telephone circuit with 2 or more main telephone stations
connected therewith each having a distinctive ring or telephone number
after he has been requested so to do to permit another to place a call, in
an emergency in which property or human life are in jeopardy and the
prompt summoning of aid is essential, to a fire or police department or for
medical aid or ambulance service, and any person who shall request the
use of such a party line by falsely stating that the same is needed for any
of said purposes knowing said statement to be false, shall be a disorderly
person; provided such party line at the time of the request is not being
used for any other such emergency call.
4 See also, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:17-15.1 (Supp. 1960). (The substance of the statute
must be printed in every telephone directory except classified directories.) Similar provisions
are made by all the other states having such statutes, with the exception of Hawaii, Idaho,
Kentucky, North Carolina and South Dakota.
5 Gov. Thomas E. Dewey said, at the signing of the New York statute:
Although the measure may pose enforcement problems, if it should save
the life of one sick person or prevent a home from being burned to the
ground, its enactment would be justified. N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1954, p. 22,
col. 5.
6 State v. Zdlinski, 166 A.2d 383, 386 (N.J. 1960).
7 E.g., transportation of an invalid by ambulance.
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mind, that an emergency existed.8 Such cases are not analogous to the telephone
situation, possibly, because the statutes involved in those cases did not define the
term "emergency."
All of the statutes but Kentucky's have provided that a person who falsely
states that an emergency exists in order to have the line relinquished will also be
criminally liable.9 In 15 states' 0 the provision applies only where the person knows
his statement to be false; the other 13 states apparently do not consider the in-
truders state of mind. The question arises whether a good faith intruder may be
prosecuted if, at the trial of the person he interrupted, or by some other means,
it is determined that no emergency in fact existed.
The statutes should be amended to provide that "emergency" not be limited
to actual jeopardous situations. When, from the potentiality of the situation con-
fronting a person, he may reasonably believe that property or human life may be
endangered, an "emergency" should exist. The party line user should not be per-
mitted to gamble that the intruder has miscalculated the seriousness of the situation.
Another problem of prosecution is proving that the defendant was in fact using
the telephone at the time of the request to relinquish it. This must be accomplished
through prosecution witnesses; hence, identification and authentication of the de-
fendant's voice is necessary. Identification by the person speaking, without more,
is not sufficient to admit the evidence." There must be other facts and circum-
stances which tend to reveal the defendant's identity. This evidence poses a ques-
tion of fact as to such identity.' 2 The facts and circumstances will be peculiar to
each case and may arise from telephone conversations, personal contacts, or both.
Where personal contact is a circumstance tending to establish identification, such
contact may be subsequent as well as prior to the telephone conversation; the time
of the personal meeting, though it may affect the credibility of the testimony, does
not control its admissibility. 13
When a case of pretext of emergency arises the problems of identification and
authentication will also be present. Unless the complaining witness can identify
the person who interrupted his conversation the prosecution will fail. Only Idaho
has provided the groundwork for the facts and circumstances which will establishidentity. Any person requesting that another person using a telephone line relinquish
the use of such line for the purpose of an emergency message shall inform
such person of the nature of the emergency, and their [sic] name and
telephone number upon request.' 4
Violations of the statutes would be reduced if the person using a line could
be certain that an interruption was necessary. A possible method to assure this is
the strict enforcement of the clause in the statutes dealing with false statements of
emergency. By adopting the substance of the Idaho provision and also requiring
the telephone number of the emergency service (or, if the call is to the operator,
that information) a state would lay a foundation for criminal proceedings against
persons falsely asserting emergencies. The person who had been using the party
line could check the data he received, allowing a reasonable time for the emergency
8 Gallup v. Sparks-Mundo Engineering Co., 43 Cal. 2d 1, 271 P.2d 34, 36 (1954);
see Lakoduk v. Cruger, 296 P.2d 690 (Wash. 1956); Sinkins v. Barcus, 168 Pa. Super. 195,
77 A.2d 717 (1951).
9 In 15 states (Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin) the
mere request for the line, knowing no emergency exists, completes the offense; the other
states require that the use of the line be secured.
10 Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin.
11 Robilio v. United States, 291 Fed. 975, 982 (6th Cir. 1923).
12 Texas Candy & Nut Co. v. Horton, 235 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Tex. 1950).
13 Massey v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 49, 266 S.W.2d 880, 883 (1954).
14 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6807 (Supp. 1959).
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call. Stopping the nuisance interruptions should reduce refusals to relinquish party
lines.
A complete defense under seven of the statutes1 5 is proof by the defendant
that he himself was using the telephone to summon emergency aid. Twenty-two
states have not specifically exempted such person from the operation of the law,
but prosecutors will probably overlook refusals for this reason, at least in cases
where the line was reopened promptly. Tennessee has added the statutory defense
of lack of knowledge or lack of reason to know of the emergency. Since the statute
has no bearing unless the party interrupting declares that an emergency exists, this
is a most curious provision. If it permits the defendant to escape conviction by
pleading that he did not think the interruption was serious, the effectiveness of the
statute is destroyed. Undoubtedly this is the chief reason why people refuse to
relinquish party lines and is precisely the thing which the statutes are intended to
prohibit.
While the statutes are similar in purpose there are unique provisions in some
which are worthy of further legislative consideration. The Kentucky statute,
though limited to calls for fire assistance, extends sanctions not only to a refusal
to surrender a party line, but to a refusal to allow anyone to use any telephone to
report a fire. Public pay telephones are included within the provisions of the
statutes of Iowa, Oregon and Tennessee, and must be surrendered when requested
for emergency use. Not only is fire, police, ambulance and medical assistance in-
cluded as legitimate emergency service in Arizona, but if "other aid" is sought,
the party line must be relinquished.
Most of the states do not provide a mandatory time for terminating the call
before guilt attaches. Hawaii, Minnesota, Pennsylvania and South Dakota have
enacted that the person on the party line must hang up "immediately." The void
in the New York statute was filled when a trial judge charged that "a person using a
party line had to yield it at once." 1 6 Cases probably will not arise because of
momentary delays in yielding the line, to permit a courteous termination of the
call.
The trial court in the Zelinski case had joined as a defendant with Mrs. Zelinski
the person with whom she was talking at the time of the interruption. This defen-
dant was released because of failure of jurisdiction,lr but it seems clear that the
statute was not intended to apply to such person. He has no control over the party
line; he cannot hold or relinquish it.
In addition to better legislation, the prosecutors and trial judges must enforce
the law rigorously in order to increase its effectiveness. They should not be content
with the moral and social sanctions imposed upon offenders by the public. Evi-
dence of this light-handed policy may be seen in the reasons given for suspending
a fine after a "party line case" conviction. Judge John R. Swartz, for instance,
said that he was convinced the defendant would not repeat the offense and no
purpose would be served by punishing her. He also thought the barn in question
would have burned to the ground anyway. The prosecutor, in his argument sup-
porting the suspension, said that conviction of the offense was punishment enough.18
To date, no cases have been located involving a civil action for refusal to sur-
render a telephone in an emergency, either as a common law tort or a violation
of a statutory duty. Such cases are certain to arise and their determination is
doubtful. Plaintiffs will probably rely upon cases in the field of fire protection to
establish the common law duty. Interference with the rights of the public to fire
protection is a common law tort in its own right. 9
15 Georgia, New' Jersey, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia and Wisconsin.
16 N.Y. Times, May 18, 1955, p. 1, col. 6.
17 N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1959, p. 22, col. 3.
18 N.Y. Times, May 25, 1955, p. 35, col. 6.
19 Cottonwood Fibre Co. v. Thompson, 359 Mo. 1062, 225 S.W.2d 702, 705 (1949).
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It has been held that when those operating a train are shown to have knowl-
edge of a fire and know that by traveling over the crossing they would impede the
extinguishment of the fire the railroad has violated a duty to the injured party.20
In the proposed telephone case, the defendant would also have knowledge of the
fire, or other dangerous situation, and know that he was preventing assistance.
Either the common law duty to refrain from knowingly obstructing emergency
aid, or the duty imposed by statute for the benefit of the property or human life
in jeopardy, 21 should suffice as a basis for maintaining suit.
A difficult burden for the plaintiff will be proof of proximate causal relation
between the refusal to relinquish the telephone and subsequent injury. Courts have
found that the results of fire-fighting are speculative and uncertain. Experience,
they have implied, shows that even the promptest action may not prevent total
destruction. 22 But there is authority for a contrary result when it appears from a
later appraisal of the fire that the delay in placing the call caused further injury
to the plaintiff. In such case, proximate cause is a question for the jury.23
Damages are subject to the same judicial scrutiny as proximate cause but
they, too, have been held ascertainable. By subtracting the damages that would
not have occurred had the aid been summoned when the party line was demanded,
from the total damages, the amount of damages awardable may be determined.24
One final sanction has been proposed by the New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.
They have asked the Public Utilities Commission for permission to cease service
to Mrs. Zelinski, and the person with whom she was talking. The grounds, they
say, are a violation of company regulations on file with the state agency.25
Anthony T. Bruno
WELFARE LEGISLATION - MEDICAL CARE FOR THE AGED - CONSTRUCTION OF
"IMPOSE A LIEN" IN THE 1960 SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS.- Title VI of the
Social Security Amendments of 1960,' an act passed by the post-convention session
of the 86th Congress, contains a program of medical care for the aged similar to
that recommended by the Eisenhower Administration. Embodied in section 601
of Title VI are the provisions which amend Title 12 of the Social Security Act by
extending additional federal matching funds to recipients of medical care under an
existing state old-age assistance program and which make available funds for a new
assistance category3 termed "aid to the medically indigent." 4
The new category provides aid to those aged persons with sufficient income
20 Id. at 706.
21 Guse v. Martin, 96 N.J.L. 262, 114 Atl. 316, 317 (B. & A. 1921).
22 Cottonwood Fibre Co. v. Thompson, 359 Mo. 1062, 225 S.W.2d 702, 707 (1949).
23 Jennings v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 307 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. 1957).
24 Ibid.
25 N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1960, p. 23, col. 1.
1 74 Stat. 924 (1960), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-06 (Supp. 1960).
2 70 Stat. 848 (1956), 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-06 .(1958).
3 Other categorical assistance programs receiving Federal grants are:
a.) Unemployment Compensation, 49 Stat. 626 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C.§§ 501-03 (1958);
b.) Aid to Dependent Children, 49 Stat. 627 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C.§§ 601-06 (1958);
c. Maternal and Child Welfare, 49 Stat. 629 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 701-
05 (1958);
d.) Aid to the Blind, 49 Stat. 645 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-06 (1958);
e.) Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, 70 Stat. 849 (1956), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1351-55 (1958).
4 S. REP. No. 1856, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1960). The term has been statutorily
defined in Revised Laws of Hawaii (1955) ch. 48 § 48-1: . . . "Medically indigent" means
a person otherwise able to subsist, but who in the emergency of sickness is not able to care
for the extra expense necessary to maintain or restore health .... 
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to meet their daily needs, who are thereby ineligible for pension type old-age assis-
tance benefits, yet who are unable to afford the cost of the increased medical atten-
tion which invariably accompanies the aging process.5 In a now familiar pattern,
a state, to qualify for the federal grant, must submit its plan for providing medical
care for the aged to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare for a check
on its compliance with certain specified requirements. Most of the requirements
are substantially identical with those in the earlier public assistance programs in
which the federal government participates. Others are designed to identify the
intended class of recipients and to insure that the purpose of the new assistance
program is accomplished.7 One additional requirement s represents, however, a
distinct departure from past federal policies, a specification absent from the categori-
cal assistance programs operative during the past 25 years.
No state plan designed to provide medical care for aged persons under the new
assistance category may require the imposition of a lien against property of a reci-
pient on account of any medical assistance payments. Without attempting to explore
in detail the implications which such a prohibition casts on the nature of govern-
ment assistance to the needy, this comment seeks to investigate, the possible impact
on state legislation which this "new" policy might have.
The following table summarizes the types of state plans under which old-age
assistance is presently administered.9
No Claim against Lien
recovery estate mandatory permissive
Number
of 19 29 16 5
states
The first group of states, those which require no repayment of assistance money
by the recipient or his estate, should have no difficulty obtaining approval of plans.
These states need only identify the class of persons eligible for assistance and the
type and quantity of benefits to be provided. In the group which provides for a
claim against the estate of a deceased recipient, 10 states need make no revision
except those mentioned above, since they make no provisions for a lien. A claim
against the estate of a deceased recipient after his surviving spouse dies is expressly
permitted by the federal act.'0 The third and fourth group of states, those with
statutes providing for either mandatory or permissive liens against the property of
old-age assistance recipients, must face squarely the interpretation of the lien im-
position provision in formulating a plan for submission to the federal authorities.
Since passage of the federal act in September, two states, Michigan and Massa-
5 106 CONG. Rnc. 15697 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1960):
Mr. Byrd of Virginia. ". . . . (This plan) provides additional match-
ing funds to the states, to first, establish a new or improve their existing
medical care program for those on the old-age assistance rolls and second,
initiate a new program designed to furnish medical assistance to those
needy elderly citizens who are not eligible for old-age assistance but who
are financially unable to pay for the medical and hospital care needed
to preserve their health and prolong their life."
6 74 Stat. 987, 988 (1960), 42 U.S.C.A. § 302 (a) 1-10 (Supp. 1960).
7 74 Stat. 988 (1960), 42 U.S.C.A. § 302 (a)(11)A-D (Supp. 1960).
8 74 Stat. 989 (1960), 42 U.S.C.A. § 302 (a) (11) E (Supp. 1960):
(A State plan . . . for medical assistance for the aged . . . must) ...
provide that no lien may be imposed against the property of any in-
dividual prior to his death on account of medical assistance for the aged
paid or to be paid on his behalf under the plan (except pursuant to thejudgment of a court on account of benefits incorrectly paid on behalf
of such individual), and that there shall be no adjustment or recovery(except, after the death of such individual and his surviving spouse,
if any, from such individual's estate) of any medical assistance for the
aged correctly paid on behalf of such individual under the plan.
9 A more complete tabulation of the characteristics of present state old-age assistance
plans is set out in the chart below.
10 74 Stat. 989 (1960), 42 U.S.C.A. § 302 (a) (11)- (E) (Supp. 1960).
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chusetts, have taken legislative action to add the new assistance category to their
present Title I programs. The two plans represent a difference of opinion over
the meaning of the phrase "impose a lien," a difference which may well spread to
other jurisdictions and continue until reconciled by the courts. The Michigan plan"'
clearly indicates that the legislators in that state take the phrase literally, and permit
no lien on property possessed by an applicant. The state agency may file a claim
against the estate of a deceased recipient, but the claim may not be presented for
payment until after the death of a surviving spouse.12 The Massachusetts plan s
provides that there shall be no recovery of any medical assistance paid on behalf
of a recipient during his lifetime,' 4 or the lifetime of his surviving spouse. How-
ever, the administering agency is apparently not prohibited from obtaining a list
of the recipient's property in the same manner as required for old-age assistance' 5
This instrument, although not a lien until fied, might constitute an encumbrance
on such property.
The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare has interpreted the phrase
"impose a lien" to mean that the state may have no lien on any property of a
recipient of medical assistanceaa This would indicate that a state plan providing
for any encumbrance against specific property during the life of a recipient, whether
or not recorded, will not qualify for federal matching funds in the medical-care-
for-the-aged category. This raises the question of whether the Secretary's interpre-
tation comports with the intention of Congress, and a possible underlying question
of whether "lien" states will participate under such an interpretation.
An inquiry into the judicial attitude toward the meaning of the word "impose"
bears little fruit. Most of the civil cases which turn on the interpretation of the
word have dealt with the creation, assessment, and collection of taxesY In the
greater number of these cases, the definition has been set by the presence, or
absence, within the statute of other words which were used to restrict or broaden
the impact of the phrase containing the word "impose." Each opinion is replete
with the principle of construction in favor of revenue collection: 8 Courts will use
the word, rather carelessly, in dealing with each of the phases in the chronology
of creation, filing, and foreclosing a lien. It is apparent that the word is ambiguous,
and that any court must turn to materials outside the reports to find a basis for
construction.
One of the most relevant sources of decisional material, the legislative history
of a statute, does not seem to be conclusive in this instance. The Senate Finance
Committee report states:
A State would not be permitted as a condition for medical assistance
to impose a lien on the property of a recipient during his lifetime. An
enrollment fee for recipients would not be permitted. However, the bill
would permit the recovery from an individual's estate after the death of
his spouse if one survives him. This provision was inserted in order to
protect the individual and his spouse from the loss of their property, usually
the home, during their lifetime. (Emphasis added) 19
If this statement expresses the intent of the Congress, then the Massachusetts plan,
construed to permit an encumbrance of record, would satisfy the specified require-
11 MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 16.521-.531 (Supp. 5, 1960).
12 Mica. STAT. ANN. § 16.525 (Supp. 5, 1960).
13 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 118A, §§ 13-32 (Supp. 7, 1960).
14 MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 118A, § 23 (Supp. 7, 1960).
15 MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. li8A, §§ 4, 4A (Supp. 1959).
16 For a similar judicial construction, see Dimke v. Finke, 209 Minn. 29, 295 N.W. 75(1940).
17 See generally the cases compiled in 20 Words and Phrases 440-44 (1958).
18 Town of Brandon v. Harvey, 105 Vt. 435, 168 Atl. 708 (1933); Moller v. People's
Nat. Bank, 258 N.Y. 373, 180 N.E. 87 (1932).
19 S. REP. No. 1856, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1960).
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ments. It is possible that such a construction might be placed on the phrase in
order to induce "lien" states to participate.
Statements made during the course of the debates in both houses of Congress
indicate that the provision was thought to be more prohibitive than the committee
report would indicate.
Mr. Proxmire: "... I should like to ask the Senator from New York
whether the only eligibility criterion would be income. Would there be
any property criterion whatever?
Mr. Javits: "None whatever."
Mr. Proxmire: "Any Hens on property?"
Mr. Javits: "None whatever."
Mr. Proxmire: ". . . I think the Senator's test is a much more at-
tractive test than the usual means test that the States apply with respect
to property, insisting on liens and paupers oaths."20
The following colloquy on the floor of the House occurred between the bill's floor
manager and several opponents of the bill.
Mr. Holland: "But will he not have to turn over his assets and property
if he receives such aid?"
Mr. Mills: "We have specifically stated in the bill that a lien cannot
be placed upon a man's home as long as he or his wife is living."
Mr. Forand: "Referring to the question of the gentleman's regarding
assignment of property, while I do not like this bill one iota, I must say
in all frankness it provides that there shall be no lien under this new
medical care program as a condition to receiving help while the recipient
lives."
Mr. Mills: "Exactly .... -21
Other factors which may influence a decision are equally indeterminate. Mean-
ings drawn from statutes of the states comprising the group which have lien pro-
visions lead to opposite conclusions. A former Idaho statute is the most interesting.
The word "impose" appeared in one section of the statute 2 in a sentence which
conferred power on the state assistance agency to file and pursue a claim against
the estate of a deceased recipient of old-age assistance. The predecessor s of that
section used the word "enforce" in the same sentence, there being no other difference
in the phraseology or apparent meaning of the two versions. The New Hampshire24
statute uses the word "impose" in the same context. In Minnesota,25 the statutory
language is to the effect that the statute itself is the instrument of imposition; the
statute speaks of the "lien hereby imposed." The same language is found in the
Wisconsin s statute. It seems evident that legislators feel that the word "impose"
may refer to enforcement or to creation.
At this point, it is worthwhile to consider possible motives which induce legis-
lators to place a lien provision in their statutes as a condition attached to the pay-
ment of old-age assistance. The fact that some states require perfected liens and
others bare claims against recipient's estates, while a third group provide for no
recovery at all, arises from varying concepts as to the nature of such assistance pay-
ments. Money paid to, or on behalf of, Title I old-age assistance recipients has
been termed a debt27 or a loan2 s by the "lien" states, a gratuity2 by the "no re-
covery" states. The latter is a more traditional view, since at common law there
was no obligation on the part of A recipient of charitable assistance to make restitu-
20 106 CoNG. REc. 15717 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1960).
21 106 CONG. REc. 16659 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1960).
22 Idaho Acts of 1947, ch. 237, § 4. This provision has been repealed and not re-enacted.
23 Idaho Acts of 1943, ch. 119, § 2. See State v. Lindstrom, 68 Idaho 226, 191 P.2d
1009 (1948).
24 N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 167:13 (1955).
25 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256.26 (6) (Supp. 1960).
26 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.26 (5) (Supp. 1961).
27 Los Angeles County v. Jessup, 11 Cal. 2d 273, 78 P.2d 1131, 1133 (1938).
28 State v. Lipnick, 99 N.H. 217, 108 A.2d 41, 43 (1954).
29 Potts v. Adams, 86 Ohio App. 311, 90 N.E.2d 703, 705 (1949).
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tion, nor was the estate liable.30 The middle ground between these extremes is
occupied by the "claim" states, where the payment is viewed as an obligation or
charge against the estate of a deceased recipient.31
The only difference between the "hen" and the "claim" provisions is the priority
which the encumbrance of record gives the state over subsequent secured and
general creditors, or any assignees or transferees. Statutory history reveals that some
of the states have struck out or modified sections in their original plans which
required liens or claim filing. The major reasons for such removals seem to be
that the proceeds have failed to justify the procedures involved,3 2 or that the policy
of encumbering the estate of a recipient was repugnant to present sociological
standards.
Some decisions from the "lien" states seem to reflect a more practical and
somewhat more acceptable reason for requiring reimbursement from recipients of
public assistance in the old age category.33 The theory rests on the proposition that
most aged persons have families or close relatives who ought to render the assistance
which the applicant seeks from the state. When such persons do exist, they should
not be permitted to avoid that obligation and yet collect from the estate of the
deceased recipient. The lien provisions would seem to be included for the sole
purpose of preventing such heirs or distributees from getting any benefit from the
estate. However, the lien provisions are unnecessary. If, as one court put it,"' the
real conflicting interest is not that of the recipient, but that of the heirs or distribu-
tees, a bare claim against the estate would insure that disfavored class of beneficiaries
would take after the state. It does not seem to be any more reasonable to require
a lien on the property of a recipient of medical care for the aged than for those on
the old-age assistance rolls. In fact, it seems less reasonable, when consideration is
given, to the fact that the possession of income or property is not the fundamental
criterion in this new category, as it is for old-age assistance. The fact of the re-
cipient's remaining financially able to maintain his status as self-sufficient for all
but medical needs will often depend on his ability to manage low income property
which contributes to his basic income. Patently, an encumbrance of any nature
would make such management more difficult, if not impossible.
However inapt the language employed, the intent of Congress seems to have
been that no lien -would come into existence against any property in which an
applicant for medical assistance has any interest. In spite of the conflicts of inter-
pretation illustrated, the conclusion is inescapable that the word "impose' will be
read in the broadest manner, to prohibit the approval of a state plan providing for
encumbrances.
Ralph H. Witt
30 Alameda County v. Janssen, 16 Cal. 2d 276, 106 P.2d 11, 15 (1940).
31 Scobey v. Fair, 70 Ohio App. 51, 45 N.E.2d 139, 140 (1942).
32 Ark. Acts 1937, No. 343, § 1: Any and all liens that arose and now remain un-
satisfied by virtue of the provisions of Section 11, of Act No. 322 of the Acts of 1935, are
hereby declared satisfied and released; ...§ 2: By reason of the creation of liens against
the property of old age pensioners under the provisions of Act No. 322 of the Acts of 1935,
difficulty is sometimes experienced in transferring titles to property and much confusion
results .
33 Elkhart County v. Kehr, 124 Ind. App. 325, 112 N.E.2d 451 (1953).























































OF EXISTING STATE OLD-Aoa ASSISTANCE PLANS
Claim Against Lien
Estate Mandatory Permissive Foreclosure
* *
rpd. '55





































Key: 1 = While recipient alive.
2 = After recipient dies.
3 = After death of surviving spouse or dependents.
rpd. = Repealed and year.
